In 1900, the physicist Henri Bénard exhibited the spontaneous formation of cells in a layer of liquid heated from below. Six or seven decades later, drastic reinterpretations of this experiment formed an important component of "chaos theory". This paper therefore is an attempt at writing the history of this experiment, its long neglect and its rediscovery. It examines Bénard's experiments from three different perspectives. First, his results are viewed in the light of the relation between experimental and mathematical approaches in fluid mechanics, leading to a re-examination of the long-term reception of Bénard's results among fluid dynamicists up to the chaos craze, whereby the traditional emphasis placed on mathematical physics is counterbalanced by greater attention to experimental approaches.
Introduction
Among the invisible things instrumental and mathematical technologies promised to unveil at the beginning of the twentieth century was "self-organization." In 1900, the young physicist Henri Bénard set up an experiment at the Collège de France in Paris to study the dynamical behavior of a thin layer of liquid, about a millimeter deep, heated from below. Experimenting with liquids of various viscosities, he invariably observed the formation of small cells that tended to stabilize in the shape of hexagons after a short period of instability. Although this struck Bénard as being reminiscent of phenomena characteristic of the living world, interest in the result quickly subsided. More than seven decades later, this simple experiment would become a stepping stone of chaos theory and indeed of all attempts to deal with selforganization and the spontaneous emergence of order. "It is interesting to note," some physicists recently wrote, "that Bénard's work was not broadly known prior to this 1970's explosion, although a limited community had continued to work on the subject, without major new discoveries." 1 How should one write the history of neglect? In the history of science, countless are the instances of intuitions not followed, of intriguing phenomena explained away by flawed reasoning, and of promising but short-lived encounters between different scientific approaches. When several decades or centuries later these instances regain relevance, their neglect suddenly becomes conspicuous, and in need of explanation. Traditional teleological accounts of neglect such as the rehabilitation of unsung scientific genius fallen into unjust 3 oblivion are now greeted with salutary suspicion. Indeed, one could argue that it is only in hindsight that those initial instances become significant such that the question of their neglect hardly arises: what needs to be explained is instead the later crystallisation that conferred new meanings to them.
Yet, it sometimes occurs that particular historical configurations do indeed prefigure in significant ways the ones that will subsequently, and sometimes after much delay, be built on those bases. Time seems to have been wrapped around and folded onto itself; an earlier epoch appears to be directly providing meaningful resources for people living and working much later, while the interpretations of the earlier episodes are significantly modified by later events; the least one could claim is that both epochs seem to be "resonating" with one another. 2 In such cases, the task of social historians of science, who must never cease to insist on accounting for historical development at the local level, becomes more difficult. In my view, the historiography of neglect has to pay attention to three aspects: the initial configuration, the later period crystallisation, and modes of transmission between them.
Historians' attention need to be drawn to both initial and final configurations on their own terms, but also in the light of each other. If they can be found, roads travelled only by the few, which connect both periods, have to be mapped out in details. Historians need to account for the fact that these roads failed to draw a crowd, as well as for why they were nonetheless kept open. And when the later blossoming of a research area does indeed echo an earlier configuration, historians can identify with greater precision the resources that were ready to be mobilized by a new generation of scientists.
In recent time, chaos has been a scientific field where historiographical problems of this kind have sprung up repeatedly. When around 1975-80 the mathematical theory of dynamical systems was adopted by a few physicists as a convenient language in which to cast some of their results, a great wave of excitement ensued. 3 People from many different fields 4 (fluid mechanics, population dynamics, meteorology, solid-states physics, etc.) were mobilized in an intricate process of disciplinary convergence. As a result of this movement, whose long-term consequences might have been more limited than enthusiasts may then have thought, some important conceptual reconfiguration nonetheless occurred. While some hailed chaos as a new scientific revolution-the third of the century after relativity and quantum mechanics, it was sometimes claimed-others pointed out that it had first been exhibited towards the end of nineteenth or the beginning of the twentieth century. 4 This singular history has intrigued actors and debates have raged among commentators ever since. Most however agreed on one point-namely, that the revisitation of many parts of Henri Poincaré's work (his memoirs on curved defined by differential equations, his study of the three-body problem in celestial mechanics, his pioneering work in dynamical systems theory and topology, his contributions to ergodic theory, and so on) played crucial parts in the emergence of chaos in the mid-1970s. The recovery of Poincaré's role in the history of chaos is another example for the history of neglect I want to explore here.
While it is no doubt true that Poincaré's work foreshadowed concerns and introduced key concepts and methods used in chaos theory, one is hard pressed to explain why the great burst of activity only took place several decades after his death (Aubin & Dahan Dalmedico, 2002) . This gave rise to various attempts at accounting for the "nontreatment" of chaos over several decades, most systematically explored by the philosopher Stephen Kellert (1993 , see also Lorenz, 1993 . In traditional interpretations, it is said that Poincaré's work simply was forgotten, which explains why its legacy was not maintained. There were two main reasons why accounts of neglect in terms of forgetting have been unsatisfying: because they eschewed the admittedly arduous task of re-examining the coherence of the large parts Poincaré's lifework related to modern dynamical systems theory and because such accounts 5 constantly downplayed the myriads of roads along which various parts of his heritage was transmitted to modern 'chaologists' (Aubin & Dahan Dalmedico 2002, pp. 279-82 contend, could only be properly understood from the post-chaos point of view.
In a similar vein, the convergences and reconfigurations connected with the fashion for chaos can give rise to new insights about the relationships between physical laws, mathematical and instrumental tools, and the phenomenon of life at the time of Bénard. 6 As Evelyn Fox Keller (2002) has recently agued, throughout the twentieth century, physical and mathematical scientists used different types of approaches to try to "explain" life. Focusing on the physical chemist Stéphane Leduc, Keller has in particular brought to light a fascinating scientific milieu where mimetic experiments with nonliving materials were enrolled in support of the materialistic conception of life. From her account, it clearly appears that, like instability in dynamical systems, the new understanding of life as a dynamic process of selforganization that emerged in the 1970s both benefits from taking a look back at work done around 1900 and modifies the way we may take that look.
In the past decades, "selforganization" imposed itself with great ideological force and at the expanse of much historical abuse (Paslack & Knost 1990; Dumouchel & Dupuy, 1983) .
Loosely grouped with other striking-sounding labels (cybernetics, chaos, emergence, 6 complexity theories-the list could go on almost indefinitely), self-organization was supposed to account for the spontaneous emergence of forms in inanimate matter, one of the major tenets of the materialistic conception of life. While one can find contemporary uses of the term, in the sense of the organization of the self (Wright, 1908, p. 613 
Mathematics and instruments in Bénard's experiment
In his scientific biography of Bénard, the physicist Eduardo Wesfreid pointed out that the jury's report for Bénard's doctoral dissertation was not free from criticisms. His results were deemed not susceptible to add much to current knowledge, apparently because he had put too little emphasis on the theoretical explanation of his experimentally-derived laws.
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Acknowledging that Bénard's mathematics seemed clumsy, positivist philosophers found enough justification for his method in the beauty of the facts experimentally uncovered (Walbois, 1901) . Such reactions are to be understood in a context where the relationship between experimental physics and mathematical physics was being revaluated due both to new advances in precision and the changing character of theoretical physics. Brillouin's assistant for his course on the general properties of fluids for which he was asked to rework old experiments from Poiseuille on the viscosity of fluids in thin channels. 9 His work on cellular vortices was carried out at the same time but independently.
We now have excellent surveys of the history of fluid mechanics showing that ca.
1900 this was a hot topic (Darrigol, 2005; Eckert, 2006 
Bénard's experimental setup
Consider a horizontal layer of liquid heated from below. In response to heating, the lower strata of the fluid expand and become lighter than the overlying strata. The warmer and lighter layers at the bottom tend to rise, while the cooler and denser top layers tend to sink. Thus In a second paper, Bénard (1900b) gave a fuller description of two methods he had used to achieve his results: suspension particles and optic. Different types of particles suspended in the liquid gave rise to various phenomena that could be observed directly:
opaque particles drew the shape of the cells (center and boundaries being clear while the intermediary surface was filled with a dégradé smooth toward the center and abrupt close to the edges); highly-reflecting laminar corpuscles produced an even more textured impression; depots could eventually be seen at the center of the cells; floating particles however tended to accumulate at the intersection of three cells. These conclusions were summarized in sketches of various cross-sections of the liquid in motion. Optical methods took advantage of the fact that the fluid surface was not totally flat. Interference patterns produced by the light reflected on a mirror at the bottom of the vat could be photographed. Inspired by the methods developed nearly half a century earlier by Léon Foucault in trying to make very regular parabolic mirrors, this method, Bénard wrote, was the most precise one allowing him to define the contour of the cells.
In lengthier publications, Bénard (1900c; 1900d For Bénard, mathematics thus was a tool helpful to describe the phenomena he had exhibited, but not a formal structure to understand its deep nature. He lauded himself for having completely solved a problem of hydrodynamics without any prior information of a theoretical nature. He admitted that he had refrained from any "attempt at coordinating" the empirical laws he had derived with "the equations of motion of viscous fluids presenting finite differences in temperature" (Bénard 1901, p. 142) . In the eyes of his community, Bénard's attempts however seemed too modest. In tune with Poincaré's optimistic modernism, physicists thought that fluid mechanics could help furthering the understanding of the relation between mathematics and experiments as well as between microscopic and macroscopic theories of matter. In the book to which Bénard had contributed, Brillouin for example claimed that experimental and theoretical considerations were easier to interpret jointly in the study of viscosity. With appropriate experimental facilities, he hoped to pursue such studies and like Jean Perrin link the molecular hypothesis with the macroscopic study of fluids. In a context where "modern electronic theories" were attracting great interest, such investigations had to be encouraged, because they dealt with interactions between molecules rather than internal to the atom (Brillouin 1907, p. 2:137) . Promising nothing of the sort, Bénard's ambition were not, for all that, modest but lay elsewhere: "one has to get used to looking at biological phenomena, no matter how complex there might be, as simply resulting from a play of forces identical, at bottom, with those whose effect we study in physical and chemical phenomena" (Bénard 1900d (Bénard , 1328 . In fluid mechanics as much as in physical biology, however, his insights into the dynamical understanding of forms lay dormant for many years to come. Before we turn to a further analysis of his thoughts on biology, let us first examine his legacy in the physical sciences.
The troublesome legacy of Bénard's experiment in physics
Since 1900, countless papers have been written about the phenomena exhibited by Bénard.
This alone indicates that if there is a history of neglect to be written about Bénard's experiment, it is not a history of how it was forgotten, for it never was! Only some of & 1961) , mainly focused on studying the way in which the system reacted when submitted to rotation, magnetic field, or a combination of the two. For physicists, the simple RayleighBénard problem, as it came to be labeled after 1916, had simply been solved.
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By 1978, the situation had changed considerably. In Grenoble, a symposium devoted solely to convection welcomed 57 papers by 65 participants from 15 different countries (Hopfinger et al., 1978) . What happened in between was of course "chaos." Just like the revival of Poincaré's work in dynamical systems, the renewal of interest in convection, and in Rayleigh-Bénard especially, was sudden and widespread. Well beyond the confines of fluid mechanics, mathematicians, solid-state physicists, chemists, and biologists paid renewed attention to the phenomenon which can be seen as a nonmaterial "boundary object." 12 But it would be a mistake to attribute this increase of interest in convection just to the emergence of chaos. While it certainly played a role in accelerating some convergences, chaos could just as well be seen as stemming from the intense study of the Rayleigh-Bénard system undertaken for reasons that had little to do with an enthusiastic embrace of a "dynamical systems approach."
Before we ask why the Rayleigh-Bénard system was so widely studied and discussed in the 1960s and 1970s, let us focus on a revealing misunderstanding that followed Rayleigh In spite of the "over-production of publications on a particular subject," there had not been "any real breakthrough in understanding" concerning the Rayleigh-Bénard system (ibid.).
Was this solely an effect of "mathematical difficulties"? This situation raises an interesting question, as was already noticed by some early chaologists:
It is striking to note that twenty years ago [i.e. 1964] little more was known about
[turbulence] than at the beginning of the nineteenth century when Navier was setting down the equations governing the flow of a fluid. . . . And yet fluid mechanics is a domain easily accessible to experiment: no laboratory machinery comes anywhere close-in complexity and in cost-to the accelerators used to study subnuclear particles! Despite its banality, this observation raises questions which historians of science will one day have to address: that of the underlying causes (circumstantial or epistemological) of the relative stagnation, in a discipline which has never lacked for practical and economic motivation (Bergé et al., p. xiii) .
Some of these claims cannot withstand even a superficial historical look. To claim that little more was known about turbulence in 1964 compared to the 1820s is obviously grossly exaggerated (Aubin, 1998, chap. 7) . The experiments that served to establish the chaotic behavior of fluid flows at the onset of turbulence crucially depended on resources that were far from being available in the 1820s, such as computers, lasers, and liquid helium. Despite claims to the effect that these experiments were of "nineteenth-century style" (Gleick 1987, 192 Takens (1971) that people could claim that "real breakthroughs" in the study of turbulence had been achieved (Aubin 2006) .
Viewed from the perspective of fluid mechanics, the neglect of the Bénard phenomenon therefore seems quite relative. Between 1900 and the 1970s, different instrumental and mathematical environments had changed its meaning completely. From a curiosity explained away by a simple analysis of force imbalances, it was turned into a crucial experiment for testing new hypotheses about the onset of turbulence. Meanwhile, the normal science machinery had cranked out a considerable number of eminently forgettable studies (perhaps also in the waiting to be rediscovered). But as pointed out above, encounters between various research agenda around the Rayleigh-Bénard system predated the recognition that dynamical systems theory and chaos would become its natural home. As we shall now see, the fluid mechanics standpoint exhausts neither the reasons why the experiment could become fashionable again in 1970s nor the full meaning it had for Bénard himself around 1900. For this, we need to explore further the analogy with living matter.
Neovitalism and the analogy with living matter
The appearance of order exhibited by Bénard was sure to captivate those who tackled it for the first time. "A fascinating aspect of the Rayleigh-Bénard instability," a physicist wrote, "consists in the existence of a remarkable periodicity-or if one prefers the existence of a 18 perfect order-in the organization of the convective cells, an order that cannot fail to surprise the one who sees it for the first time" (Bergé, 1976, p. 24 Thom (1975) , and later chaos theorists, showed renewed interest in the Rayleigh-Bénard phenomenon, Rayleigh's solution no longer seemed satisfying. Their ambition was boundless and they often associated this phenomenon with processes characteristic of the living world.
To the few who then bothered to go back to the dusty volumes holding his lengthy papers, the proximity of Bénard's outlook with new claims made in favor of a dynamical understanding of life came as a surprise. In fact, in 1900, Bénard was the first to be surprised when he realized that a physical experiment had given rise to structures that reminded him of living tissue. As opposed to Heidelberg zoologist Otto Büschli, Bénard had no intention to contribute to biology when he designed his experiment: "Studying a purely physical problem, in conditions as simple as possible, I was never guided by considerations foreign to physics" (Bénard, 1900d (Bénard, , p. 1328 . Prompted, he said, by the interest manifested by some naturalists, he was led to state the implications of his results on biology explicitly:
The shape of the currents I was able to observe in liquids offering no other heterogeneity than temperature differences are, if I am not mistaken, especially interesting and novel in that they are examples of remarkably simple physical phenomena able to create from scratch a cellular structure that seem, up until now, to be particular to living beings and characteristic of the organic world. 13 To have been able to reveal a phenomenon of self-organization previously thought to arise solely in living tissues seemed particularly significant to Bénard. Pondering on the "consequences" of his experiments "from the point of view of biological theories," he concluded: "Purely physical research, such as this, might perhaps have some interest in the eyes of scientists who do not despair of reducing the complex phenomena of life to the general laws of inorganic nature." 14 In his more popular account published in the Revue générale des sciences, Bénard was even bolder. Living matter, he wrote, was formed of liquids or semi-liquids that were divided in stable cells. Regular hexagonal assemblages were very common in living tissue and therefore should correspond to a "general law of stability."
Even though the phenomena he had exhibited arose spontaneously through the action of heat, it was "legitimate to predict that the same structure . . . could emerge under the action of forces altogether different: for example, in the cases of the complex mixtures in protoplasma, it could result from simple phenomena of diffusion and osmosis." He went on:
In spite of the coarseness of our present means of investigation to observe what is happening inside a living cell, it would be contrary to the scientific mind to condemn in advance this line of research as necessarily unproductive. Many bold speculations may be backed by the history of experimental science, which provides enough examples of alleged chasms that are today bridged in spite of Metaphysics that deemed them unbridgeable. 15 The imperialistic incursion of a physical scientist into biology is never necessarily welcome.
As Toulouse physicist Henri Bouasse, known for his penchant for polemics and his francparler, expressed it tactlessly, physics "may be taken as the ideal-type of a complete experimental science. All other [sciences] strive to resemble to it" (quoted in Meyerson, 1921, p. 1:126) . In the early twentieth century, however, vitalist theses went through a significant revival. In his the presidential address in front of the biology section at the 1911 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Scottish zoologist D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1911) forcefully drew attention to the contemporary re-emergence of vitalism. A real and urgent question, this was perhaps the greatest a biologist could tackle. Thompson, 1961, pp. 104-7) .
Debates about vitalism, and especially the role physics and chemistry could play in the understanding of the nature of life, therefore provided an opening for attempts such as Bénard's. Although it seems to have been little noticed by contemporary vitalists or their opponents, the contribution made by Bénard was, as we have seen, wholly in favour of a physicalist interpretation of life, by suggesting that some simple structures could arise from a purely physical system, without resorting to any sort of vital force. Among the various phenomena observable in living matter, Bénard singled out self-organization. "Neovitalism,"
as it was sometimes called, never was a well structured movement, but it left the room open for a certain number of scientists to oppose it by trying to show that some manifestations of life could be explained solely on the basis of known chemical and physical laws (Séliber, 1910; Bosc, 1913; Mourgue, 1918) . Brillouin (1900) himself published articles where he put his expertise as physicist in the service of physiology. Of course in a context where fundamental laws in physics themselves were in the process of being fundamentally revised, to exclude a priori that any sort of vital force existed hardly was tenable. In a popular work, the Jena physicist Felix Auerbach (1910) promoted the notion of "ectropy," the biological antithesis of entropy. More famously, embryologist Hans Driesch, philosopher Henri
Bergson, and many others believed that evidences in favour of the existence of some vital principles (entelechy, élan vital) were now conclusive.
Focusing on Leduc's chemical models, which she says were "almost self-evidently absurd," Keller showed how active was the field of "synthetic biology" in this period (Keller, 2002, pp. 307 & 11) . She explained that the role played by those models in "demonstrat [ing] that complex forms-comparable in complexity to those found in the living world-could be brought into existence by recognizable physical and chemical processes" (ibid., p. 11-2) . In
Leduc's own words, since living beings were composed of the same chemical elements as the mineral world, since the same physical was at play in them as in nonliving matter, "what constituted the [living] being was form and structure." Pushed to its limit, this reasoning implied that "biology was part of the physical chemistry of liquids" (Leduc 1910, p. 6 ).
Bénard never expressed his views concerning vitalism, nor did he state a clear definition of life. Probably sensing that this would not lead him far career-wise, he never even pursued the intuitions he put forward in 1900-01. But the suggestions with which he concluded his papers are clear indications that the reason he thought his experiments could contribute to the debate about vitalism hinged on one particular propriety of living matter-its spontaneous structuring in hexagonal shapes. For him, this was definite evidence against the need to resort to vital forces to account for the way in which inanimate or living matter acquired its structure. To resituate Bénard's experiments in the vitalist debate of the first decades of the twentieth century thus gives a framework within which, even though the term had yet to appear, they truly were about "self-organization" as one of the characteristic features of life. But, on must notice that instability, turbulence, and chaos were not in Bénard's picture.
Order out of chaos: Prigogine and the Bénard system
About Bénard cells, a philosopher wrote "the general thrust of this apparently childish example is physical and cosmic. . . . It is therefore possible to explore the idea of a universe where order and organization are constituted in turbulence, instability, deviance, improbability, and the dissipation of energy" (Morin, 1977, p. 41) . While the instrumental and mathematical contexts had, as we have seen, been radically overhauled since 1900, the antimechanist climates of both periods on the contrary had a lot in common. Prigogine is well attested (Keller 2002, pp. 93-5) . Biologist Henri Atlan (1971) also saw his attention drawn to Bénard cells.
Let us focus on the way in which the biological analogy was crucial in Prigogine's wish to promote the study of the Bénard phenomenon. In 1971, he published together with Paul Glansdorff a book that would reach a large audience despite its technicalities. In this book, they wrote that the Bénard system "is an especially enlightening example of the degree of unification that our method allows us to achieve between problems pertinent to thermodynamics and hydrodynamics" (Glansdorff & Prigogine 1971b, p. 3) . For them, the Rayleigh-Bénard problem (which they most often conflated with the Bénard problem)
provided one of the main examples of the application of a method first developed for nonequilibrium thermodynamics. As early as 1955, Prigogine had started extending his study of irreversible thermodynamics to the nonlinear domain having possible applications to biology in view (on Prigogine, see Brans et al. 1988; Stengers 1997) . In 1967, Glansdorff and
Prigogine distinguished between two kinds of structures in matter, those arising in equilibrium (e.g. crystals) and those arising in out-of-equilibrium conditions, which they called "dissipative structures." 16 A few years later, Prigogine defined them as follows: "beyond a critical level dissipation can become an organizing factor, destabilize the disordered state, . . . and drive the system to an ordered configuration. Hence the term dissipative structure" (Prigogine, 1975, p. v) . The two most intensely studied exemplars of dissipative structures were the Rayleigh-Bénard system and the periodic chemical reactions such as those exhibited by Soviet chemists Belousov and Zhabotinsky in 1950s, which instead of tending towards an equilibrium state, exhibited oscillatory behaviors (Prigogine 1968, p. vii-viii) .
23 chemical systems, which Prigogine approached from the analogy with hydrodynamic instability, were particularly interesting in that they exhibited a spontaneous appearance of order in time and space under the influence of dissipation. Instability gave rise to structure, chaos to order. Now, the role played by Prigogine in promoting the interdisciplinary study of the Rayleigh-Bénard system in the late 1960s was tremendous. In 1965, he organized a conference at the University of Chicago, with Chandrasekhar in attendance. A strong emphasis was put on the unifying prospect of using variational techniques in many fields of science, from statistical mechanics to hydrodynamics. The analogy between hydrodynamic instability and phase transition was forcefully emphasized, using convection as a test case (Donnelly, et al. 1966) .
In 1973 a Conference on Instability and Dissipative Structures in
Hydrodynamics was held at Brussels, where Prigogine and his collaborators, fluid dynamicists, and a French group of physicists from Orsay led by Gilles de Gennes, tried to identify the commonalties of their respective approaches. Prigogine expressed the "analogies" he saw at play between different dissipative systems:
The purpose of this volume is to present a number of problems involving hydrodynamic instabilities from the standpoint of irreversible thermodynamics of dissipative structures. We hope that the analogies with chemical kinetics and the existence of common underlying ideas in all phenomena involving the emergence of order in a previously disordered medium will stimulate further research in these fascinating areas (Prigogine, 1975, p. vi, my emphasis) .
Besides his study on dissipative structures, Prigogine then saw recent developments of the mathematical analysis of nonlinear differential equations as a useful advance. To problems of instability, Prigogine contended "one may apply the powerful tools of the qualitative analytical-topological theory initiated by Poincaré, continued by Andronov, and completed to 24 perfection by Thom [sic] " (Nicolis et al., 1975, p. 2) . 18 Prigogine saw fluid mechanics as a traditional testing ground for new mathematical approaches:
Fluid mechanics, which was the first field to show, more than a century ago, the emergence of patterns of order, has long been developed independently of irreversible thermodynamics and fluctuations. On the other hand, it has always been the privileged field where new mathematical techniques and ideas were tried and applied (Prigogine 1975, p. vi) . variously-shaped obstacles (Bénard 1908b, 840) .
After WWI, Bénard and Theodor van Kármán were involved in a minor priority dispute about whether or not the series of alternate vortices produced behind a moving object in a fluid should be named the "Kármánsche Wirbelstrasse" or "boulevard de Bénard" (Weisfred, 2006; Van Kármán, 1967) . What is more significant than priority however is the fact that
Bénard saw in his use of cinematography the distinctive feature of his work. He sarcastically commented on van Kármán and Rubach's 1912 paper that they had merely pointed out that it 26 would be possible to use cinematography, which he himself had done obtaining more precise results.
Recent historiography of the cinema has emphasized the close relationship between the development of this form of representation and science (Mannoni, 1995; Lefebvre 1996 ).
Bénard's reliance on Léon Gaumont's generosity was very characteristic of the Collège de France. Gaumont who had been trained at Léon Jaubert's Observatoire populaire du
Trocadéro and also at the Carpentier instrument-making firm, had a very strong interest in The evidence one can derive about Bénard's intent from the few remaining films would at first sight seem rather scant. The films mainly consist of rather long shots of the onset of the cell structure and its evolution until the liquid in the vat evaporates completely.
No comment is made. Still, as the subtitles express, there is a definite impulse for classifying the various types of observable cells depending on the nature of the liquid or initial conditions. Attention is drawn to the fact that there are at least two "species" of cells and that they sometimes organize themselves in chains. Mostly, the phenomenon is presented as a dynamical one and the organization of inanimate matter that it shows is clearly meant to seem uncanny.
At the root of the documentary genre, the Gaumont Encyclopaedia was studied by were also flying for the first time (Guy, 1976, pp. 49-51) .
Guy was also directly involved in scientific applications of the cinema. In his experiments on animal and human respiration, dog's heartbeat during dissection, the motion of the ataxic, the facial expressions of the demented, the Collège de France physiologist François-Franck was assisted by Guy and a colleague of hers Lucienne Chevreton who would later marry the physiologist. Tending the X-ray apparatuses which people flocked to see barely six weeks after Röntgen's discovery was announced at the Academy of Sciences, Guy was left with a scar on her hand (Guy, 1976, p. 80; Delmeulle, 1999, p. 61) .
As a matter of fact, early cinematography was a delicate technique where scientific and technical concerns were to the fore.
Today's movie directors have no idea of the hardships and setbacks we had to go through to get those films; if a neglectful operator forgot to brush the velvet frame of the apparatus, the full length of the film would be scratched; if a negligent developer forgot to stir the developing tank, then dark zones would streak part of the stripe;
water bubbles would form and poke holes in the negative; if solutions were too warm, emulsions would melt, sometimes it would be torn from its basis and destroy the result of our efforts. One had to deal with the instability of the stand, the lack of tightness of our containers, the unevenness of light. The emulsion of the film, much less sensitive than now, would only record a small part of the spectrum and gave out black-andwhite images with brutal contrasts, etc. (Guy, 1976, p. 218) .
The technical investment consented by Bénard when he chose the chronophotograph and the cinematograph therefore was by no means small. So, it is most surprising that there is so little memory remaining from Bénard's cinematographic work. The chronophotography allowed no more than an analysis of fleeting dynamic phenomena at a more leisurely pace, just like Jules Janssen's had wished to do when he invented the photographic revolver that is the ancestor of cinema (Canales 2002 (Canales & 2006 Launay & Hingley 2005) . The cinematograph, on the other hand, was designed to recreate the studied phenomenon: "giving the observer the faculty of seeing again the scene that he studies as many times as necessary" (Anonymous 1909, p. 682) . In the interwar period, the increasing importance of civil and military aviation gave a tremendous boost to the field of fluid mechanics. Lavishly funded institutes were set up throughout France. Hired at the Sorbonne's Institut de Mécanique des Fluides, Bénard would go on making films about fluids some of which distributed by Gaumont. In the course of his career, he made, and carefully analyzed the data of, over 130 films which were apparently thrown away by German soldiers occupying the Fluid Mechanics Institute during World War II. Bénard's cinematographic legacy was not neglected; it was simply destroyed.
Conclusion
In the 1900 volume of the Revue générale des sciences pures et appliquées, Poincaré discussed the relation between experimental and mathematical physics, Brillouin put his expertise as physicist in the service of the physiology of nerves and Marinesco explored some of the application of cinematography to biology and art. In his experiments on convective cells published in the same volume, Bénard addressed all those issues in his own way. To express his belief that the spontaneous structuring of inorganic matter he had exhibited had something to do with the phenomenon of life, he used the best tool he had at his disposal for exhibiting a dynamic process: the cinematograph. In the way in which Bénard seems to have used it, the cinema preserved dynamical processes so that they could be measured; it conferred to their artificial reconstitutions a striking lifelike quality; but contrary to dynamical mathematical tools it was not in itself a means for understanding the analogy.
Yet, remembering that in his 1902-03 lectures at the Collège de France, the philosopher Bergson argued against the "cinematographic nature" of contemporary knowledge and in favor of a vitalist philosophy of becoming, we may wonder whether
Bénard's cinematographic studies of lifelike qualities of fluids-or at least, the types of considerations that had led him to such speculations-were not implicit in Bergson's discussion. In his analysis, by focusing on snapshots, this type of understanding forewent the possibility of explaining becoming in general. In particular, the problem of how form arose in the living body, he claimed, was unthinkable with such an approach:
Now, life is an evolution. We concentrate a period of this evolution in a stable view which we call a form, and, when the change has become considerable enough to overcome the fortunate inertia of our perception, we say that the body has changed its form. But in reality the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no form, since form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot view of a transition. Therefore, here again, our perception manages to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real. When the successive images do not differ from each other too much, we consider them all as the waxing and waning of a single mean image, or as the deformation of this image in different directions (Bergson, 1911, p. 301) .
As the case of Bénard shows, Bergson might have been right when he pointed out that the understanding of form, its creation, its persistence and its destruction, was impossible using the cinematographic method. To deal with such themes in an alternative manner using qualitative mathematics was the projects of the D'Arcy Thompsons, the Thoms, and the Prigogines. It would be useful to remember that the recovery of Bergon's philosophy of form also was a project of the 1970s (besides Progogine, see Deleuze 1968 Deleuze & 1983 ). Yet, the cinematographic understanding of the lifelike phenomena Bénard was concerned with is closer than ever to some developed recently, in particular the notion of "artificial life," or "ALife," developed by Christopher Langton (1986) and others (Doyle 2004; Helmrich 2004; Emmeche 2004 ). Drawing parallels between Leduc's work, strongly disqualified in his time, and the contemporary excitement over A-Life, Keller emphasized the importance of warrelated research in the 1940s for conferring its legitimacy of computer simulation. In the case of the Rayleigh-Bénard system, as well, the development of numerical approaches on the computer played an important part in the renewal of interest (to start with, with Edward Lorenz's work). The computer became the instrument that could be used to merge cinematographic knowledge with qualitative dynamics. In this context, Bénard's analogies 32 were allowed to gain greater fame as well as deeper significance. In other words, the history of neglect perhaps is no more than the contingent history of insignificance.
